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Abstract— In the wide scenario of packet processing 
architectures, the development of ever sophisticated applications 
faces the challenge of finding a balance between different 
requirements: ever increasing performance, flexibility, and 
portability of the software across different platforms and hardware 
architectures. The Network Virtual Machine (NetVM) aims at 
responding to such defy by taking into account all these elements 
and by providing an abstract architecture for developing today’s 
packet processing applications. In order to demonstrate that the 
NetVM platform can be profitably employed for the development 
of complex applications, we developed a Snort-like network 
intrusion detection sensor. In this paper we present its architecture 
and show that NetVM represents an excellent target for the 
dynamic generation of packet processing programs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In order to keep the pace with the everyday increasing 
requirements in terms of throughput and flexibility, the design of 
high-speed packet processing applications relies always more on 
network processors. However, the problem of running a packet 
processing application on architectures other than general-
purpose processors is very complex, and it gets more difficult as 
the complexity of the application grows. The reasons of this 
issue are several and of different nature: differences between the 
various architectures and programming paradigms (single-
threaded, multi-threaded, multi-process on a multi-core 
processor), difficulties in exploiting the available hardware 
resources, like ad-hoc instructions and coprocessors. This 
problem is further complicated by the several different 
architectures available for packet processing (network 
processors, multi-core, systolic processors, etc.). 
The problem is only apparently simplified when working with 
network processors that are based on a general-purpose 
architecture, such as the Cavium Octeon multi-MIPS processor, 
because a simple recompilation and minimum changes to the 
application enable the production of running code, in spite of 
sacrificing the ability to exploit the hardware resources available 
on the target machine, such as the Octeon's Deterministic Finite 
Automata coprocessors. The problem can be solved by rewriting 
some parts of the application, but this solution is not general, 
and if the architecture changes again, the work has to be 
restarted from scratch. In this scenario, the NetVM virtual 
platform [1] represents a general solution for such problems, 
because it provides an abstract architecture for packet 
processing applications, which is able to hide the differences 
between physical platforms. 
Even though the presented advantages of the NetVM 
platform look promising, it must be noted that some of them are 
in fact only claims that need to be further explored and 
demonstrated. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the first 
of such claims, i.e. that the NetVM is suitable for the 
development of complex real-world applications, and that such 
development could be carried out in a relatively easy manner. 
To prove this statement, we have built an IDS sensor that 
represents one of the typical applications that could run on the 
NetVM architecture. This application was chosen due to its 
requirements in terms of processing capabilities and the 
necessity to deal with multiple protocol layers including deep 
packet inspection. In addition, IDSs are suitable for hardware 
acceleration because of their extensive use of regular 
expressions and lookup tables, which are often assisted by 
specialized coprocessors on physical platforms. In addition, 
even if this will require deeper studies, this paper will point out 
that the code generated for the NetVM is efficient, i.e. 
performances are comparable with the same application running 
natively on the target platform. 
This work is organized as follows. Section II and III present 
respectively the related work and a brief recap of the 
technologies that are the foundation of this paper. Section IV 
presents the architecture of our implementation, while the 
evaluation of the results is given in Section V. Finally, Section 
VI will present some conclusive remarks. 
II. RELATED WORK  
The rise of network processors generated the demand for new 
programming models for easing the development of packet 
processing applications for such highly special purpose 
architectures, while still allowing the performances needed for 
keeping the pace with ever increasing line rates and traffic 
loads. In particular, [2] and [3] propose different software 
models for building complete routers through the 
interconnection of simple packet processing modules. [4] and 
  
[5] propose two different packet processing languages and 
compilers for automatically partitioning the code to be executed 
on the microengines of the Intel IXP2400 network processor. 
While such solutions are similar to the one proposed by NetVM, 
they tend to focus on a specific application (e.g. packet 
forwarding), or on a specific architecture (e.g. Intel NPUs). 
The implementation of a complete Snort-like intrusion 
detection sensor on a network processor was first explored by 
[6] that presents a compiler for generating C code from a set of 
intrusion signatures to be executed on an Intel IXP1200 NPU.  
Since network intrusion detection relies on deep packet 
inspection functionalities, such as string and regular expression 
matching, great effort has been directed towards solutions for 
optimizing and offloading such processor intensive tasks 
through efficient algorithms and specialized hardware modules 
or coprocessors [7][8][9][10][11][12]. Another approach is 
using optimized algorithms targeted over the physical hardware 
platform; for example, [13] proposes a modified version of the 
Aho-Corasick [14] string-matching algorithm that can be 
executed in parallel on several microengines of the Intel 
IXP1200 network processor. However, our approach aims at 
validating the entire application instead of speeding up specific 
functions such as only string and RegEx matching. 
III. RELATED TECHNOLOGIES 
A. The NetVM Virtual Machine 
The Network Virtual machine (NetVM) [1] is an abstract 
packet-handling engine that allows the portability of network 
processing applications across heterogeneous architectures. 
In NetVM a packet-processing program is expressed as a set 
of modules called Network Processing Elements (NetPEs), 
which represent virtual processors that execute a mid-level 
assembly language called NetVM Intermediate Language 
(NetIL). The interconnections between different modules 
determine the behavior of the entire application. Figure 1 shows 
an example on how a simple packet forwarding element can be 
implemented as a NetVM application. 
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Figure 1. NetVM Based Forwarding Element. 
The elementary execution engine, the NetPE, is a stack-based 
processor that is made up of a set of private registers (e.g. stack 
pointer, etc) and a memory hierarchy. The code instantiated on a 
single NetPE can be mapped on real processing engines on the 
physical hardware according to the best strategy. Execution of a 
NetVM program on real hardware relies on an implementation 
of the virtual machine, which can be an interpreter or a compiler 
for the translation of NetIL code to native machine code.  
The NetVM has been designed to facilitate the translation of 
NetIL into native code: Figure 2 shows the complete 
architecture: a high level language (i.e. Snort rules) is used to 
produce NetIL code through an appropriate compiler. Then, a 
Just-in-Time compiler is used to produce the final binary code, 
which can then be executed on the target processing platform. 
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Figure 2. The code generation process in NetVM. 
Since packet-processing applications usually rely on a subset 
of functionalities that are often implemented directly in 
hardware on many network processor architectures (e.g. Content 
Addressable Memories for fast table lookups, Deterministic 
Finite Automata coprocessors for string and regular expression 
matching), the NetVM architecture includes the concept of 
virtual coprocessors, i.e. a well-defined interface for making 
such features available to the programmer. An application 
considers coprocessors as “black boxes” providing specific 
operations, accessible through a well-defined interface that 
guarantees software portability among different platforms. On 
architectures that do not provide any hardware acceleration, 
coprocessors could be emulated by software. More details on 
the NetVM architecture are presented in [1]. 
B. Snort 
Snort [15] is the implementation of a passive network IDS 
that is the de-facto reference in this class of applications; hence 
it seemed an obvious choice to design our own IDS by keeping 
compatibility with its rules and alerting formats. This way our 
IDS would get immediate benefit from the huge database of 
already-existing attack signatures, which would also offer an 
excellent testing environment. 
Snort is currently capable of performing real-time traffic 
analysis and packet logging on IP networks. Its architecture is 
highly modular, and its capabilities include protocol analysis 
and content searching, which can be used to detect a variety of 
attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, 
CGI attacks, SMB probes, and many other security threats. 
  
Snort uses a database of rules to describe the known attacks. 
Each rule describes a number of tests that should be performed 
on a packet, such as searching for a particular IP address or TCP 
port in the packet header, or matching a string or a regular 
expression in the payload. If all the tests specified in a rule are 
verified, then the corresponding action is undertaken (e.g. 
sending an alert and/or logging the packet).  For example, the 
following rule: 
 
log tcp any any -> 10.1.1.0/24 80 \ 
         (content: "GET"; msg: "HTTP GET";) 
 
logs every packet coming from any host and directed to port 
80 of any machine of the 10.1.1.0/24 network containing the 
‘GET’ string. Such packets will be logged with a message 
saying “HTTP GET”. 
More details on the Snort IDS can be found in [15].  
IV. ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTRUSION DETECTION SENSOR 
The IDS sensor for the NetVM is not a direct port of Snort: 
the two applications share almost no lines of code. Our solution 
is based on a custom compiler that takes Snort rules and creates 
NetVM assembly. The internal architecture had to be redesigned 
from scratch in order to take full advantage of the NetVM 
paradigm, which tries to exploit the intrinsic modularization 
seen in packet-processing applications that are usually made up 
of several short and independent tasks. As the Snort rule format 
basically specifies tests that might involve the different 
protocols present in a packet, we decided to create different 
modules, instantiated on different Network Processing Elements 
(NetPEs). Tests on each protocol are performed in the NetPE 
responsible for it, with the exception of some special functions 
(such as packet analysis and pattern matching) that are not 
associated to a single protocol and that are allocated to specific 
NetPEs. The final architecture is shown in Figure 3. 
 For instance, the rule mentioned before will involve 
generation of code in different modules: the IP one will check 
that the destination address matches; the TCP module will be 
involved for checking the value of the TCP destination port, and 
so on. The rule will match only if all the tests are verified. 
The NetPE abstraction offers the possibility of an excellent 
modularization: each module is almost independent, and 
performance can be incremented by simply improving the code 
generation for NetPEs that represent the bottleneck, 
implementing ad-hoc strategies to minimize the number of tests 
to be performed on a packet. For instance, some rarely used 
modules (e.g. ICMP) use a very simple algorithm (linear 
search), while others implement smarter strategies. Global 
optimizations can also be implemented in the NetVM 
framework to be able to reduce the size of the target code. 
In the NetVM model, NetPEs communicate among 
themselves through exchange buffers, i.e. meta-packets that, 
besides the packet buffer, contain additional data (e.g. time 
stamps) and a dedicated area called info partition, where 
modules can store state information that flows through the 
NetVM following the same path of the packet. Each module 
composing the IDS exploits the info partition for keeping the 
matching state of every rule and for communicating it to 
subsequent modules. In particular, the info partition is divided in 
two parts: the former contains a bit-vector, in which every bit 
represents a rule, while the latter is further organised into 
several 32-bit slots, each one containing data extracted from the 
packet, such as source IP address, port, etc. 
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Figure 3. Architecture of the NetVM IDS sensor. 
A. Packet-processing workflow 
The processing of a new packet starts with the Protocol 
Analysis module that extracts information on the protocol 
headers present in the packet and records the starting offset of 
the payload. This piece of information is stored inside the “info 
partition” of the exchange buffer and is therefore made available 
to all the following modules in the chain.The next module is 
dedicated to Content Matching, which matches the payload 
against a set of static patterns and regular expressions specified 
in the source rules. This task relies on string and regular 
expression matching coprocessors provided by the NetVM 
architecture. The location of this module, almost in front of the 
processing chain, is due to performance reasons. In fact, the 
search is carried out by a modified version of the well-known 
Aho-Corasick algorithm [14] that allows several patterns to be 
searched at the same time. As a result, if a pattern is found 
inside the payload, only the subset of rules based on it needs to 
be extensively verified. 
Further modules will refine the processing by performing 
only the tests that are required on the subset of rules that have 
been selected as “possibly matching” in the previous modules. 
For instance, the IP, TCP and UDP modules group together all 
the rules that have the same addresses/ports, so that they only 
have to check each different combination of IP and netmask 
once. Another optimization consists in testing the destination 
address/port first, and then, if it matches, the source 
address/port. This approach is justified by the fact that attacks 
  
come from anywhere (hence no source address is usually 
specified in real-world rules), while the addresses of the servers 
in the internal network are well-known. Testing if the packet 
contains a precise destination address allows discarding a large 
number of packets immediately, reducing the ones that need to 
be further processed in order to detect a match. 
The Ethernet module only checks if the packet contains IPv4 
or IPv6, and sends it to the proper module, or just discards it in 
case the network-layer protocol is not supported. This module 
does not provide any rule matching functionalities. 
The IPv4/IPv6 modules implement the tests over source and 
destination network addresses, while the TCP and UDP 
modules take care of checking the source and destination 
TCP/UDP ports of the packet, and the ICMP one checks all the 
possible ICMP options, which involve tests on the ICMP type, 
code, ID and sequence number. 
The Connection Tracking and Connection Status 
Matching modules perform stateful TCP connection tracking, 
distinguishing who initiated the connection, the direction a 
packet is travelling in (i.e., from server to client or vice-versa) 
and the state of the connection (i.e., established or still in the 
handshake phase). This task is performed with the aid of a 
lookup coprocessor that acts as an associative memory holding 
information on the current state of active TCP connections. 
Finally, the Payload module handles the non-content payload-
related options, such as tests on the payload size. 
Connections among the various PEs are organized so that 
each incoming packet only traverses the subset of PEs dealing 
with the protocols it contains. This could be easily achieved 
through a scheme modelled after the TCP/IP protocol stack, as 
shown in Figure 3. This architecture has many advantages: first, 
each protocol is analysed only once. Second, the knowledge of a 
protocol is embedded in a single place, making debugging and 
improving the handling of a protocol easier. Furthermore, the 
addition of a new protocol simply requires a new NetPE to be 
inserted in the chain. Third, the number of traversed NetPEs is 
small, i.e. packets traverse only NetPEs responsible of protocols 
that are present in the packet (i.e. an UDP packet will not 
traverse the NetPE dedicated to TCP), with a clear advantage 
from the performance viewpoint. Fourth, the architecture is 
suitable for pipelining. At the moment, the application handles 
one packet at a time, but potentially it could handle more 
packets if the NetPEs can be instantiated on different physical 
execution units (e.g. in case of the Octeon multicore chip). 
B. The code generation process 
The traditional approach in intrusion detection applications is 
usually based on iterating over the rules that are represented in 
memory as complex data structures. For our IDS we decided to 
follow a different approach to the problem. In our 
implementation, rule checks are directly embedded in the code. 
In particular, instead of producing static programs that iterate 
over data structures in memory, the code directly implements all 
the checks needed for matching packets against the rules. Such a 
choice is based on the consideration that rules data remains 
constant throughout the execution of the program and such 
information can be exploited in order to emit checks (i.e. branch 
instructions) based on constant values (instead of checks based 
on values loaded from memory) producing more efficient code 
and opening the way to further optimizations. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In order to assess the validity of our approach we made a 
series of tests using a real Snort rule database. We used an 
official ruleset provided by the Snort website in February 2007, 
which includes a total of 3058 rules, 1389 of them supported by 
our application. Such an apparent limitation is mainly due to the 
high number of rules requiring normalization and inspection of 
the URI field of HTTP headers (i.e. the uricontent option), 
which is a feature currently not supported by our application. 
We consider such number a fair one, because it includes all the 
rules needing deep packet inspection functionalities (i.e. string 
and regular expression matching), and it is in line with other 
research works [10][11][12]. 
Table 1 shows the number of NetIL instructions generated 
from the abovementioned ruleset for each module of our IDS. It  
is evident that the Content Matching module is the one with the 
highest number of instructions. The reason depends on the 
complexity of the rules involving content matching options. 
TABLE 1 
PROFILING THE CODE GENERATED FOR EACH MODULE 
Module Number of NetIL instructions 
Number of x86 
instructions 
Code size 
(bytes) 
Analyzer 137 163 613 
Content Matching 38872 268.667 1.130.250 
ethernet 10 20 104 
ip 4531 2.057 13.991 
icmp 5547 2.906 16.737 
udp 4806 1.838 13.173 
tcp 5127 2.100 14.442 
Connection Tracking 141 261 1.271 
Conn. Status Matching 6228 2.097 14.054 
Total 65399 280.109 1.204.635 
 
In order to evaluate the performance of our IDS sensor we 
measured the time needed to process a trace of 10M packets 
captured on a real network and we compared the results with 
those obtained running Snort under the same conditions. All the 
tests were performed on a Dual Xeon running at 3,4 GHz 
equipped with Linux 2.6.20-15 SMP. The NetVM application 
was compiled Just in Time into x86 assembly, while Snort was 
compiled through GCC version 4.1.2. Besides, all the features 
not supported by our IDS (e.g. flow reassembly) were disabled 
in Snort. The tests have been repeated 12 times, and results have 
been averaged excluding the best and the worst run. Results are 
  
shown in Table 2. 
TABLE 2  
THROUGHPUT OF THE TWO APPLICATIONS 
Application Packets/Second 
NetVM IDS (interpreted) 5.634 
NetVM IDS (with x86 JIT) 70.344 
Snort (native) 97.922 
 
Results look interesting. Performances of the IDS sensor 
interpreted by the virtual machine are discouraging, but this is 
expected: a virtual machine is not optimized for performance. 
Instead, performances obtained with the same code translated 
into native x86 code look promising, with our implementation 
running at 70% of the speed of the original Snort, although 
performance was not yet an objective at this stage. Differences 
in speed are due to several factors: the IDS code that does not 
implements all the performance-oriented tricks of Snort, because 
of the complexity of generating such code in NetIL assembly. In 
addition, the x86 JIT is still in an early stage and it implements 
only the most common optimizations, compared to the full set of 
optimizations implemented in GCC4. Our belief is that a more 
careful implementation of the JIT could further boost the 
performance, getting us closer to the original Snort. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents the implementation of a network 
intrusion detection sensor for the NetVM platform. The 
objective of this work is to demonstrate that the NetVM 
abstraction is suitable for creating packet-processing 
applications both in terms of virtualized primitives (e.g. the 
NetPE abstraction, which enables an excellent modularization of 
the code) and in terms of performance.  
The current status of the IDS sensor is not as mature as the 
original Snort. For instance, some features (such as the IP 
defragmenter and TCP flow reassembly) are missing, and some 
application-layer keywords in the rule language are not 
supported. However, our objective was not to create a perfect 
clone of Snort running on the NetVM, while creating a 
reasonable proof-of-concept application that demonstrates the 
validity of the NetVM architecture. From this point of view, 
results are interesting: a complex application can be 
implemented on the NetVM, and currently it runs at a 
reasonable speed. The intrinsic modularization offered by 
NetPEs enables the creation of complex applications, while the 
NetVM instruction set (and coprocessors) is adequate for 
packet-processing software. The biggest problem encountered in 
creating the IDS sensor is the lack of a high-level compiler that 
can be used to write applications. The data-oriented approach 
followed by our ruleset compiler is partially a choice, but 
partially a necessity because of the lack of a C-like compiler for 
the NetVM. This may be interesting to pursue as the next step in 
order to improve the programmability of our platform. 
Future works will include the support for more keywords 
(which will enable a better coverage of the rule set), a further 
refinement of the NetVM development tool chain (e.g. in terms 
of backend compilers) in order to achieve even better 
performance, and the integration of this code with the NetPDL 
language [16], which enables the dynamic generation of code 
for locating protocol fields. 
An extended version of this paper is available in the 
Technical Report DAI-NTG-2008-11, available online at 
http://netgroup.polito.it/pubs/pdf/2008/DAI-NTG-2008-11.pdf 
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